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NOTES
THE FIRST STEP ACT AND INDIVIDUALIZED
REVIEW: MUST JUDGES APPLY THE 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(A) FACTORS TO SECTION 404
PETITIONERS?
Kielan Barua*
In 2010, the U.S. Congress amended the notorious mandatory minimum
sentencing structure for crack cocaine offenses in response to the decades of
harm it had caused. As the amendment was not retroactive, Congress passed
the First Step Act of 2018 to allow prisoners incarcerated before 2010 to
petition their original sentencing court for discretionary relief based on the
new penalties. However, what exactly these courts must do when deciding
whether to grant relief has divided the circuits. Some circuits require an
up-to-date consideration of defendants’ individual mitigating circumstances
and whether their sentences are the minimum necessary to satisfy the
purposes of sentencing, as courts must do at initial sentencing under 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a). Other circuits permit such consideration but refuse to
require it, finding a mandatory approach at odds with the discretionary
nature of the First Step Act itself.
This Note discusses the text and intent of the First Step Act, including the
historical context reflected by the legislation, as well as the importance of 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a). It then examines the reasoning employed by each side in
deciding whether to require consideration of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in First
Step Act proceedings. Ultimately, this Note concludes that the First Step Act
should be read to require consideration of § 3553(a) because that approach
better promotes the purpose of the Act without contravening its text and
provides considerable benefits in practice.
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INTRODUCTION
On July 13, 2000, Jose Moyhernandez was sentenced to thirty years in
prison for conspiracy to distribute over fifty grams of crack cocaine and for
unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition.1 At sentencing, Judge
1. See United States v. Moyhernandez, No. 97-CR-197, 2020 WL 728780, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2020), aff’d, 5 F.4th 195 (2d Cir. 2021).
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Michael Mukasey stated that he would have sentenced Moyhernandez to
twenty-five years in prison had he not been bound by the then mandatory
Federal Sentencing Guidelines2 (“Guidelines”). In 2018, the U.S. Congress
passed the First Step Act of 2018,3 which, under section 404, made
retroactive the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010’s4 reduction of penalties for
certain crack cocaine offenses.5 Moyhernandez soon after filed a motion for
relief pursuant to the statutory penalty reduction for the first count of his
conviction.6 With Moyhernandez’s motion before Judge Loretta Preska,7 the
district court denied relief because the First Step Act did not change his status
as a career offender and so his (now advisory)8 Guidelines range remained
unchanged from his initial sentencing.9
On July 15, 2021, the Second Circuit upheld the district court’s denial of
Moyhernandez’s motion,10 despite there being no consideration therein of
Judge Mukasey’s reluctant dependence on Guidelines that were—but no
longer are—mandatory.11 Affirming Judge Preska’s 2020 decision, the
Second Circuit held that a court deciding a motion under section 404 of the
First Step Act may, but need not, consider the factors outlined in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)12 (“§ 3553(a) factors”), which all federal courts must now consider
before imposing an initial sentence.13 These factors require sentencing
courts to reflect on, among other things, the “nature and circumstances of the
offense,” the defendant’s personal history and characteristics, the extent to
which the sentence will promote deterrence or rehabilitation, and the need to
avoid sentencing disparity between similarly situated defendants.14
Moyhernandez was denied the opportunity to have his sentence reconsidered
in light of these factors.15

2. See Appendix of Defendant-Appellant at 39, United States v. Moyhernandez, 5 F.4th
195 (2021) (No. 20-625) (transcript of original sentencing). In the original sentencing hearing,
Judge Mukasey stated, “If I were operating outside the guidelines regime I agree [that
twenty-five years is a fair sentence] and if I were operating outside the guidelines regime I
could carry that agreement into effect but I am not.” Id.
3. Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18,
21, and 34 U.S.C.).
4. Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21
and 28 U.S.C.).
5. First Step Act § 404, 21 U.S.C. § 841 note.
6. See Moyhernandez, 2020 WL 728780, at *1.
7. Judge Mukasey retired from the federal bench in 2006. See Michael Mukasey
Confirmed as Attorney General, CNN (Nov. 8, 2007, 11:26 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2007/
POLITICS/11/08/mukasey/ [https://perma.cc/E76Z-J9WN].
8. See infra Part I.B (explaining why the Guidelines are no longer mandatory).
9. See Moyhernandez, 2020 WL 728780, at *2.
10. United States v. Moyhernandez, 5 F.4th 195, 198 (2d Cir. 2021), petition for cert.
filed, No. 21-6009 (U.S. Oct. 15, 2021).
11. See id. at 209 (Pooler, J., dissenting).
12. See id. at 203–05 (majority opinion).
13. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)–(7).
14. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, FEDERAL SENTENCING: THE BASICS 2 (2015).
15. See Moyhernandez, 5 F.4th at 209 (Pooler, J., dissenting).
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In so doing, the court deepened a circuit split, joining the First,16 Eighth,17
Tenth,18 and Eleventh19 Circuits by merely permitting consideration of the
§ 3553(a) factors (“the discretionary approach”) in contrast to the Third,20
Fourth,21 Sixth,22 and D.C.23 Circuits, which have all required it (“the
mandatory approach”).
The D.C. Circuit’s opinion in United States v. White24 highlights the effect
of adopting the latter approach. Antone White and Eric Hicks had been
sentenced to life imprisonment for selling and conspiring to distribute crack
cocaine as part of a large-scale drug organization.25 At the time, White and
Hicks were twenty-one and twenty-four years old, respectively.26 After the
two filed for sentence reductions under the First Step Act, a federal district
court in the District of Columbia denied White’s motion and granted partial
relief to Hicks.27 The court first ruled that, barring one count for Hicks, relief
was not “available” because the First Step Act did not alter the Guidelines
range for the quantities for which they were sentenced.28 It then noted that
relief would not be warranted for either defendant even if it were possible.29
For White, his leadership role in the drug-trafficking organization, his
(uncharged) murder of two witnesses in connection to his original trial, and
his history of violent infractions while incarcerated30 all counseled against
reducing his sentence.31 Hicks shared leadership in the organization with
White, bribed a witness to not testify during his original trial, and caused a
high-speed car accident in attempting to escape arrest.32 This disregard for
the law persuaded the district court that, like White, Hicks deserved to remain
imprisoned under the other counts of his sentence.33
In reversing, the D.C. Circuit found the district court’s analysis incorrect
and incomplete.34 The circuit court first held that the First Step Act allows
16. See United States v. Concepcion, 991 F.3d 279, 289 (1st Cir. 2021), cert. granted, 142
S. Ct. 54 (2021) (No. 20-1650) (mem.).
17. See United States v. Moore, 963 F.3d 725, 727–28 (8th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141
S. Ct. 1118 (2021) (mem.).
18. See United States v. Mannie, 971 F.3d 1145, 1157 (10th Cir. 2020).
19. See United States v. Stevens, 997 F.3d 1307, 1315–17 (11th Cir. 2021).
20. See United States v. Easter, 975 F.3d 318, 323–24 (3d Cir. 2020).
21. See United States v. Chambers, 956 F.3d 667, 674 (4th Cir. 2020).
22. See United States v. Boulding, 960 F.3d 774, 784–85 (6th Cir. 2020).
23. See United States v. White, 984 F.3d 76, 90–91 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
24. 984 F.3d 76 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
25. See id. at 82–84.
26. Brief for Appellants at 13–15, United States v. White, 984 F.3d 76 (D.C. Cir. 2020)
(No. 19-3058).
27. United States v. White, 413 F. Supp. 3d 15, 19 (D.D.C. 2019), rev’d and remanded,
984 F.3d 76 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
28. Id. at 50–52.
29. Id. at 51–52.
30. Id. at 52. The most recent infraction occurred ten years prior to the district court’s
opinion. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. United States v. White, 984 F.3d 76, 92 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
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judges to reduce petitioners’ sentences even if their Guidelines ranges
remained the same.35 Turning to the district court’s assessment of White’s
and Hicks’s individual records, the D.C. Circuit highlighted important
§ 3553(a) factors concerning the petitioners that the district court had
ignored.36
White’s father was in and out of prison all his life, and his mother, who
was also incarcerated when White was a teenager, suffered from drug
addiction.37 He was sentenced at twenty-one years old.38 While he was
imprisoned, White earned his GED and completed over eighty-five classes,
mentored numerous young prisoners, had no violent infractions in the ten
years prior to the district court’s opinion, and had no infractions at all in the
last four-and-a-half years.39 Similarly, Hicks had a difficult upbringing, as
his parents disappeared when he was five years old, he was only twenty-four
years old when sentenced, and he had a relatively clean disciplinary record
while in prison (with even fewer infractions than White).40 Further, while
incarcerated, he obtained a paralegal certificate, tutored and mentored other
prisoners, and cofounded an organization that raised money from other
prisoners to donate to the outside community.41 He also maintained strong
relationships with his wife and children.42 The district court’s failure to
consider these factors merited reversal, and the case was remanded with
instructions to consider the mitigating evidence presented under § 3553(a).43
Part I of this Note discusses the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 198644 and how
it created the context in which the Fair Sentencing Act and First Step Act
arose. It next discusses the § 3553(a) factors, including how their importance
changed after the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in United States v.
Booker,45 before explaining how the Guidelines operate today post-Booker.
Part II describes the current circuit split regarding the interplay between
28 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and section 404 of the First Step Act, first discussing the
circuits following the mandatory approach before turning to those that have
adopted the discretionary approach. Finally, Part III argues that the
mandatory approach is preferable in light of the First Step Act’s text and
purpose, as well as other practical considerations.

35. Id. at 87–88.
36. Id. at 92–93.
37. Id. at 91.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 91–92.
42. Id. at 92.
43. Id. at 92–93.
44. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.).
45. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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I. CRACK COCAINE SENTENCING BACKGROUND
Federal sentencing underwent a major shift in the 1980s, when the
traditional, judicially managed “indeterminate” form of sentencing was
replaced by penalties mandated by statute or the Guidelines.46 The
Sentencing Reform Act of 198447 established the U.S. Sentencing
Commission (“Commission”) and charged it with creating guidelines that
would bind federal judges to predetermined ranges based on, among other
things, the type of crime committed and the defendant’s prior record;48 the
Guidelines became active in 1987.49 The Supreme Court in Booker later
deemed the mandatory aspect of these Guidelines to be unconstitutional.50
In 1986, Congress passed the first Anti-Drug Abuse Act, which, among
other things, set severe mandatory minimum sentences for crack cocaine
offenses compared to powder cocaine offenses.51 The particular focus on
crack cocaine resulted in increased racial disparity in federal sentencing.52
Congress responded in 2010 by enacting the Fair Sentencing Act, which
reduced the discrepancy in penalties between crack and powder cocaine.53 It
then made this change retroactive to defendants sentenced prior to 2010 by
passing the First Step Act of 2018.54
Part I.A provides an overview of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, the Fair
Sentencing Act, and the First Step Act. It details the injuries that the Fair
Sentencing Act and First Step Act sought to remedy and the way in which
defendants may obtain relief under the First Step Act. Part I.B discusses the
role of the § 3553(a) factors in federal sentencing, and Part I.C describes the
Guidelines and how they operate in conjunction with the § 3553(a) factors
post-Booker.
A. The First Step Act and Fair Sentencing Act as Responses to the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act
The following section proceeds by describing in Part I.A.1 the damage
wrought by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act before explaining in Part I.A.2 how the
Fair Sentencing Act responded to it by adjusting the sentencing penalties for
crack cocaine. Part I.A.3 then discusses how the First Step Act applies the
46. See LISA M. SEGHETTI, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL32766, FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES: BACKGROUND, LEGAL ANALYSIS, AND POLICY OPTIONS 2–4 (2009); U.S. SENT’G
COMM’N, FEDERAL SENTENCING: THE BASICS 2–3 (2020).
47. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.).
48. See SEGHETTI, supra note 46, at 4.
49. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 46, at 3.
50. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 259–64.
51. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1002, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-2
to 3207-3 (setting the punishment for possession of five grams of crack cocaine at the same
level as the punishment for possession of 500 grams of powder cocaine).
52. See infra notes 64–70 and accompanying text.
53. Pub L. No. 111-220, §§ 2–3, 124 Stat. 2372, 2372 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)).
54. Pub. L. No. 115–391, § 404, 132 Stat. 5222, 5222 (codified as amended in scattered
section of 18, 21, and 34 U.S.C.).
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Fair Sentencing Act retroactively and how this may implicate the § 3553(a)
factors.
1. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act
Enacted to combat the “crack epidemic” said to be spreading across the
United States during the 1980s,55 the Anti-Drug Abuse Act required a
minimum sentence of five years for defendants convicted of possession of
five grams of “cocaine base”56 with intent to distribute and a minimum
sentence of ten years for defendants convicted of possession of fifty grams.57
The corresponding penalties for powder cocaine are triggered at 500 grams
and 5000 grams, respectively,58 effectively creating a 100:1 sentencing ratio
between the two forms of cocaine.59 These mandatory minimum provisions
were intended to target leaders of drug organizations.60 However, by 2007,
the majority of convicted crack cocaine offenders were street-level dealers.61
Compounding the problem, defendants with prior drug convictions could
see their penalties easily skyrocket, as prosecutors could seek double the
mandatory minimum sentence for crack cocaine offenses if the defendant had
one prior conviction for a felony drug offense, and prosecutors could seek
mandatory life imprisonment if the defendant had two.62 This often led to
crack cocaine offenders serving over twenty years—or even life terms—in
prison for committing only nonviolent offenses.63
The racially discriminatory impact of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act was
severe. Its penalty scheme for crack cocaine offenses resulted in the

55. See 132 CONG. REC. 22675 (1986) (statement of Rep. Barbara Mikulski).
56. While the term “crack cocaine” does not appear in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, “cocaine
base” includes crack cocaine. See DePierre v. United States, 564 U.S. 70, 74 (2011); see also
id. at 79–83 (holding that “cocaine base” includes all substances that could be described as
cocaine in its chemically basic form, not just crack cocaine).
57. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), (B)(iii).
58. Id. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii), (B)(ii).
59. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act was amended in 1988 to impose a mandatory minimum of
five years for simple possession of crack cocaine. See DEBORAH J. VAGINS & JESSELYN
MCCURDY, ACLU, CRACKS IN THE SYSTEM: TWENTY YEARS OF THE UNJUST FEDERAL CRACK
COCAINE LAW 2 (2006), http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/drugpolicy/cracksinsystem_20061025.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZSC9-4ZAM]. There is no corresponding minimum for simple possession
of powder cocaine. Id.
60. See 132 CONG. REC. 27193 (1986) (statement of Sen. Robert Byrd) (stating that the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act targets “kingpins,” who “can be identified by the amount of drugs with
which they are involved”).
61. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL
SENTENCING POLICY 19 (2007).
62. See DEF. SERVS. OFF., HOW A PERSON WHOSE SENTENCE WAS PREVIOUSLY ENHANCED
ON A “FELONY DRUG OFFENSE” UNDER 21 U.S.C. § 851 WOULD RECEIVE A LOWER
SENTENCE TODAY 1 (2019), https://www.fd.org/sites/default/files/criminal_defense_topics/
essential_topics/sentencing_resources/clemency/clemency-how-a-person-who-received-851enhancement-would-receive-a-lower-sentence-today.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8KC-P2EM].
63. See Statement of Reasons at 27–29, 37–38, United States v. Kupa, No. 11-CR-345
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2013) (Gleeson, J.) (citing cases involving defendants who were convicted
of crack cocaine offenses and who served mandatory twenty-year or life sentences without
ever having committed a violent crime).
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imprisonment of Black Americans at a disproportionately high rate and for
disproportionately long periods of time.64 One reason the racial disparity
arose is because crack cocaine is disproportionately consumed in large
cities.65 Crack cocaine is significantly cheaper than powder cocaine and is
thus more prevalent in low-income urban neighborhoods, many of which
have predominantly Black populations.66 Accordingly, the new policy
immediately increased the sentence lengths of Black defendants relative to
white defendants in cocaine-related cases.67 Not only were Black crack
cocaine offenders imprisoned at a higher rate than users of powder cocaine,
a nearly identical drug, but they were also convicted more often than white
or Hispanic crack cocaine users.68 By 2000, there were more Black men
imprisoned than enrolled in higher education.69 By 2014, 83.4 percent of
convicted crack cocaine trafficking offenders were Black.70
Further, a rational basis for the 100:1 ratio had been punctured by
subsequent scientific research.71 Crack cocaine and powder cocaine are
pharmacologically similar72 and equally likely to cause violent reactions in

64. See VAGINS & MCCURDY, supra note 59, at 7; see also Gabriel J. Chin, Race, the War
on Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction, 6 J. GENDER RACE &
JUST. 253, 263–69 (2002) (questioning whether there is a legitimate explanation for the
disproportionate punishments between white and Black offenders).
65. See Alyssa L. Beaver, Note, Getting a Fix on Cocaine Sentencing Policy: Reforming
the Sentencing Scheme of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2531, 2549
(2010).
66. See Joseph J. Palamar et al., Powder Cocaine and Crack Use in the United States: An
Examination of Risk for Arrest and Socioeconomic Disparities in Use, 149 DRUG & ALCOHOL
DEPENDENCE 108, 114 (2015); see also id. (finding that socioeconomic status may be a better
predictor of crack cocaine use than race).
67. See BARBARA S. MEIERHOEFER, THE GENERAL EFFECT OF MANDATORY MINIMUM
PRISON TERMS: A LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF FEDERAL SENTENCES IMPOSED 20 (1992)
(explaining that in 1984 and 1986, Black defendants on average received 28 percent and 11
percent longer sentences and that four years after the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1986, this number jumped to 49 percent).
68. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, CRACK COCAINE SENTENCING POLICY: UNJUSTIFIED
UNREASONABLE 2 (2000)
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/sp/1003.pdf
AND
[https://perma.cc/5PAL-37T3] (noting that despite approximately two-thirds of crack users
being white or Hispanic, in 1994, 84.5 percent of defendants convicted of crack cocaine
possession were Black, as were 88.3 percent of defendants convicted for trafficking); Dan
Weikel, War on Crack Targets Minorities over Whites, L.A. TIMES (May 21, 1995,
12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1995-05-21-mn-4468-story.html
[https://perma.cc/UL69-K87Y] (“No whites were federally prosecuted in 17 states and many
cities, including Boston, Denver, Chicago, Miami, Dallas and Los Angeles. Out of hundreds
of cases, only one white was convicted in California, two in Texas, three in New York and
two in Pennsylvania.”).
69. See VAGINS & MCCURDY, supra note 59, at 3 tbl.3.
70. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: IMPACT OF THE FAIR SENTENCING
ACT OF 2010, at 12 fig.2 (2015).
71. See Gabby Birenbaum, The EQUAL Act Would Finally Close the Cocaine Sentencing
Disparity, VOX (Mar. 19, 2021, 2:10 PM), https://www.vox.com/2021/3/19/22336224/equalact-cocaine-sentencing-disparity-war-on-drugs [https://perma.cc/896E-V59Q].
72. See CARL L. HART ET AL., METHAMPHETAMINE: FACT VS. FICTION AND LESSONS FROM
THE CRACK HYSTERIA 2 (2014).
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users.73 The Commission had repeatedly instructed Congress that the 100:1
lacked an empirical basis.74 However, Congress took no action until 2010.75
2. The Fair Sentencing Act
In light of the discriminatory and unreasonable nature of this policy,
Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act in 2010 and reduced the sentencing
disparity between crack cocaine and powder cocaine offenses.76 The Fair
Sentencing Act increased the amount of crack cocaine necessary to trigger
the mandatory minimum sentences for offenses involving distribution77 and
eliminated the mandatory minimum altogether for simple possession.78 The
new ratio is approximately 18:1.79 However, this legislation did not provide
relief to the many defendants sentenced prior to the enactment of the Fair
Sentencing Act.80
3. The First Step Act
As the Fair Sentencing Act did not provide relief to defendants sentenced
before 2010,81 Congress passed the First Step Act in 2018 in part to apply
the Fair Sentencing Act retroactively.82 Incarcerated defendants convicted

73. See Michael G. Vaughn et al., Is Crack Cocaine Use Associated with Greater Violence
than Powdered Cocaine Use? Results From a National Sample, 36 AM. J. DRUG & ALCOHOL
ABUSE 181, 183 (2010).
74. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 61, at 7–8 (reaffirming its 2002 report to
Congress, which found that the sentencing disparity did not reflect the relative harmfulness of
crack cocaine compared to powder cocaine); see infra Part I.C (explaining the Commission’s
role in federal sentencing policy).
75. See KARA GOTSCH, AM. CONST. SOC’Y, “AFTER” THE WAR ON DRUGS: THE FAIR
SENTENCING ACT AND THE UNFINISHED POLICY REFORM AGENDA 4–6 (2011).
76. See 156 CONG. REC. 3658 (2010) (statement of Sen. Richard Durbin) (noting that the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act “singled out [Black people] for much more severe and heavy
sentences.”); id. at 3660 (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) (“The racial imbalance that has
resulted from the cocaine sentencing disparity disparages the Constitution’s promise of equal
treatment for all Americans.”).
77. See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 2(a), 124 Stat. 2372, 2372
(amending 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) to decrease the ratio between the amount of powder cocaine
needed to trigger mandatory minimums from 100:1 to approximately 18:1).
78. Fair Sentencing Act § 3.
79. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 70, at 3. Of note, the U.S. Department of Justice
now believes that this law does not go far enough, arguing that any discrepancy in punishment
between the two drugs reflects a misconception about the effects of powder and crack cocaine.
See Sarah N. Lynch, U.S. Justice Department Backs Bill to End Disparities in Crack Cocaine
Sentences, REUTERS (June 22, 2021 6:05 AM), https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-justicedepartment-backs-bill-end-disparities-crack-cocaine-sentences-2021-06-22/
[https://perma.cc/RU52-JGGQ].
80. See Charlotte Resing, How the First Step Act Moves Criminal Justice Reform
Forward, ACLU (Dec. 3, 2018, 4:00 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/smart-justice/massincarceration/how-first-step-act-moves-criminal-justice-reform-forward
[https://perma.cc/9Z9P-TFDD].
81. Id.
82. First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222. The text of
section 404, the retroactive provision, reads in its entirety:
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of one of the “covered offenses” under the Fair Sentencing Act and sentenced
prior to 2010 are now eligible for resentencing under section 404 of the First
Step Act.83 This requires that defendants had been sentenced for a crack
cocaine offense that triggered a mandatory minimum sentence.84 To get
relief, eligible defendants must submit a petition to the court that originally
sentenced them,85 which may then “impose a reduced sentence as if sections
2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 were in effect at the time the
covered offense was committed.”86 However, sentence reduction is not
guaranteed, as the First Step Act gives the sentencing court “broad
discretion” to deny the petition.87
Following the failure of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act to accomplish its stated
goals,88 the First Step Act was a bipartisan89 bill intended to address the
racially disparate impact that was produced by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act and
that was unremedied by the Fair Sentencing Act.90 Senator Cory Booker,
(a) DEFINITION OF COVERED OFFENSE.—In this section, the term “covered offense”
means a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which
were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (Public Law
111–220; 124 Stat. 2372), that was committed before August 3, 2010.
(b) DEFENDANTS PREVIOUSLY SENTENCED.—A court that imposed a sentence for a
covered offense may, on motion of the defendant, the Director of the Bureau of
Prisons, the attorney for the Government, or the court, impose a reduced sentence
as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (Public Law 111–220; 124
Stat. 2372) were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed.
(c) LIMITATIONS.—No court shall entertain a motion made under this section to
reduce a sentence if the sentence was previously imposed or previously reduced in
accordance with the amendments made by sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing
Act of 2010 (Public Law 111–220; 124 Stat. 2372) or if a previous motion made
under this section to reduce the sentence was, after the date of enactment of this Act,
denied after a complete review of the motion on the merits. Nothing in this section
shall be construed to require a court to reduce any sentence pursuant to this section.
83. Id.
84. See Terry v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1858, 1862–64 (2021).
85. See NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45558, THE FIRST STEP ACT OF 2018: AN
OVERVIEW 9 (2019).
86. First Step Act § 404(b).
87. See United States v. Mannie, 971 F.3d 1145, 1155 (10th Cir. 2020).
88. See VAGINS & MCCURDY, supra note 59, at ii.
89. Final Vote Results for Roll Call 448: First Step Act of 2018, S. 756 (Dec. 20, 2018),
https://clerk.house.gov/evs/2018/roll448.xml [https://perma.cc/NEZ6-NSHW] (passing the
House of Representatives by a vote of 358–36); Roll Call Vote: First Step Act of 2018,
S. 756, 115th Cong. (Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/
roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=115&session=2&vote=00271
[https://perma.cc/99P8YXW5] (passing the Senate by a vote of 87–12); see also Brief of Senators Richard J. Durbin,
Charles E. Grassley, Cory A. Booker & Mike Lee as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at
7–8, Terry v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1858 (2021) (No. 20-5904) (noting support for the First
Step Act from independent organizations across the political spectrum, including the
American Civil Liberties Union and the American Conservative Union).
90. See 164 CONG. REC. S7764 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2018) (statement of Sen. Cory Booker)
(stating that the First Step Act “addresses some of the racial disparities in our system because
90 percent of the people who will benefit from [the Act] are African Americans; 96 percent
are Black and Latino.”); id. at S7644 (statement of Sen. Richard Durbin) (“We also have to
consider the racially disparate impact of these laws . . . . [T]he majority of illegal drug users
and dealers in America are White, but three-quarters of the people serving time in prison for
drug offenses are African American or Latino . . . and the large majority of those subject to
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one of the original cosponsors of the First Step Act,91 noted an unfairness in
allowing certain prisoners to continue serving out sentences no longer
recognized as valid by law while more serious crack cocaine offenders could
benefit from shorter sentences under the then current framework.92 The act
was also motivated by a rehabilitative attitude toward sentencing.93 Yet, it
is clear from the Congressional Record that the Act intended to give judges
the discretion to deny otherwise eligible motions if warranted by the facts of
the individual defendant’s case.94
The most current data on First Step Act petitions indicate that the Act is
having its intended effect.95 The Congressional Record shows that only
approximately 2600 inmates were thought to be affected;96 however, as of
May 2021, there have been 3705 sentence reductions granted under section
404,97 with defendants sentenced as far back as 1990 obtaining relief.98 The
average age of petitioners at original sentencing has been thirty-two years,
and the average age at resentencing has been forty-six years.99
Approximately 92 percent of successful petitioners have been Black.100 The
average reduction in a defendant’s prison term has been seventy-two months,
which represents an approximately 25 percent decrease from the original
sentence.101
Motions for sentence reductions under section 404 are now typically filed
under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B),102 which permits the court to “modify an
imposed term of imprisonment to the extent otherwise expressly permitted
Federal mandatory minimum penalties fall into that same group of African Americans and
Latinos.”).
91. See S.3649, 115th Cong. (2018).
92. See 164 CONG. REC. S7764 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2018) (statement of Sen. Cory Booker)
(“[T]here are people sitting in jail right now for selling an amount of drugs equal to the size
of a candy bar who have watched people come in and leave jail for selling enough drugs to fill
a suitcase. We never made [the Fair Sentencing Act] retroactive. That is not justice.”).
93. See id. at S7745 (statement of Sen. Richard Blumenthal) (stating that sentence
reductions under the First Step Act will incentivize prisoners to prepare for reentry into
society).
94. See id. at S7739 (statement of Sen. Charles Schumer) (“[T]he legislation is certainly
not a ‘get out of jail free’ card . . . .”); id. at S7748 (statement of Sen. Amy Klobuchar)
(“Significantly, this bill will not automatically reduce any one person’s prison sentence . . . .
[Rather,] it allows judges and prosecutors to look at an individualized case and decide . . .
what is best for the community.”).
95. See generally U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, FIRST STEP ACT OF 2018 RESENTENCING
PROVISIONS RETROACTIVITY DATA REPORT (2021), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/
files/pdf/research-and-publications/retroactivity-analyses/first-step-act/20210519-First-StepAct-Retro.pdf [https://perma.cc/6SRA-DTXN].
96. See 164 CONG. REC. S7745 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2018) (statement of Sen. Richard
Blumenthal).
97. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 95, tbl.1.
98. Id. tbl.2.
99. Id. tbl.4
100. Id.
101. Id. tbl.6.
102. See, e.g., United States v. Concepcion, 991 F.3d 279, 287 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 142
S. Ct. 54 (2021) (No. 20-1650) (mem.); United States v. Easter, 975 F.3d 318, 323–24 (3d Cir.
2020); United States v. Moore, 963 F. 3d 725, 728 (8th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct.
1118 (2021) (mem.); United States v. Chambers, 956 F.3d 667, 673 (4th Cir. 2020).
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by statute . . . .”103 This refers judges to the text of the First Step Act to
determine the scope of their authority.104 Early on, the Fifth Circuit had
analyzed section 404 motions under the framework of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2),105 which permits judges to “modify a term of imprisonment”
for defendants who were sentenced based on Guidelines that were later
lowered by the Commission.106 The Supreme Court held in Dillon v. United
States107 that § 3582(c)(2) authorizes only “a limited adjustment to an
otherwise final sentence and not a plenary resentencing proceeding.”108
Further, it noted that § 3582(c)(2) requires consideration of the § 3553(a)
factors only “to the extent that they are applicable”109 and cannot be used to
reduce a defendant’s sentence.110
Other circuits, however, have not strictly followed this approach, with
most analyzing section 404 motions under § 3582(c)(1)(B).111 The
distinction between § 3582(c)(2) and § 3582(c)(1)(B) is relevant because
while the former only allows limited consideration of § 3553(a), the latter is
silent on it and directs courts to other congressional statutes for instruction.112
Here, the First Step Act allows judges to “impose a reduced sentence,”113
which certain courts interpret as requiring consideration of the § 3553(a)
factors because judges must consider these factors when they “impose” a
sentence.114

103. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B).
104. See Sarah E. Ryan, Judicial Authority Under the First Step Act: What Congress
Conferred Through Section 404, 52 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 67, 94 (2020).
105. See United States v. Hegwood, 934 F.3d 414, 418 (5th Cir. 2019).
106. Id. at 417 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)).
107. 560 U.S. 817 (2010).
108. Id. at 826.
109. Id.
110. See id. at 827 (“Consistent with the limited nature of § 3582(c)(2) proceedings,
§ 1B1.10(b)(2) also confines the extent of the reduction authorized.”).
111. See, e.g., United States v. Concepcion, 991 F.3d 279, 290 (1st Cir.) (“[W]e have
determined . . . that section 3582(c)(1)(B), not section 3582(c)(2), governs section 404(b)
proceedings.”), cert. granted, 142 S. Ct. 54 (2021) (No. 20-1650) (mem.); United States v.
Holloway, 956 F.3d 660, 665–66 (2d Cir. 2020) (holding that a First Step Act motion is
properly evaluated under § 3582(c)(1)(B) rather than § 3582(c)(2) because “a First Step Act
motion is based on the Act’s own explicit statutory authorization, rather than on any action of
the Sentencing Commission”); United States v. Easter, 975 F.3d 318, 323 (3d Cir. 2020)
(“First Step Act Motions fall under § 3582(c)(1)(B).”); United States v. Wirsing, 943 F.3d
175, 185 (4th Cir. 2019) (“[T]he distinct language of the First Step Act compels the
interpretation that motions for relief under that statute are appropriately brought
under § 3582(c)(1)(B).”). The Eleventh Circuit has gone so far as to hold that section 404 is
“its own procedural vehicle” that need not be filed under § 3582(c)(1)(B) or any other statute.
See United States v. Edwards, 997 F.3d 1115, 1119 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 509
(2021).
112. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B).
113. First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5222 (emphasis
added).
114. See, e.g., Easter, 975 F.3d at 323–24; United States v. Chambers, 956 F.3d 667, 673
(4th Cir. 2020); see also Ryan, supra note 104, at 98 (discussing the potential effect of
analyzing First Step Act motions under § 3582(c)(2) as opposed to § 3582(c)(1)(B)).
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B. The 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) Factors
In imposing all criminal sentences, Congress and the Supreme Court
require that district courts consider the § 3553(a) factors to ensure that a
defendant receives an individualized sentence.115 These factors are:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed . . . to reflect the seriousness of the
offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for
the offense; . . . to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; . . . to
protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and . . . to provide
the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care,
or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for . . . the
applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of
defendant as set forth in the guidelines . . . ;
(5) any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing
Commission . . . subject to any amendments made to such policy statement
by act of Congress . . . ;
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants
with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.116

As former federal judge Mark W. Bennett observed, only through “super
careful analysis and very thoughtful consideration of the § 3553(a) factors”
can a judge impose a balanced sentence.117 These factors provide the
sentencing judge with broad discretion to consider defendant-specific
characteristics that the Guidelines fail to account for.118 Further, the statute
requires that judges limit sentences to terms that are the minimum necessary
to accomplish the purposes of sentencing as set out in the second § 3553(a)
factor.119
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, the
§ 3553(a) factors were “all but irrelevant”120 because the Guidelines were

115. See Mark W. Bennett, A Judge’s Attempt at Sentencing Inconsistency After Booker:
Judge (Ret.) Mark W. Bennett’s Guidelines for Sentencing, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 243, 254–55
(2019).
116. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)–(7).
117. Bennett, supra note 115, at 261.
118. See id. at 273 (citing drug addiction, childhood trauma, mental disorder, and military
service as examples of individual mitigating circumstances that the Guidelines do not
mention).
119. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
120. Erica Zunkel, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)’s Undervalued Sentencing Command: Providing
a Federal Criminal Defendant with Rehabilitation, Training, and Treatment in “the Most
Effective Manner,” 9 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L. 49, 54 (2019).
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essentially mandatory.121 The Supreme Court later found in Booker,
however, that the mandatory element of the Guidelines was
unconstitutional.122 After Booker, the Guidelines became advisory123 and
the § 3553(a) factors became the “touchstone” of federal sentencing.124
Indeed, failure to explicitly consider these factors on the record is grounds
for remand.125 However, the thoroughness of these considerations depends
on the complexity of the case and the context provided by the record.126 For
example, where the same court conducted the defendant’s original sentencing
hearing and adequately considered the § 3553(a) factors, a court at
resentencing may satisfy § 3553(a) by signing a form certifying that it had
considered the § 3553(a) factors in determining the new sentence.127
Following this watershed change in the sentencing process, the
Commission has questioned the impact of Booker on racial sentencing
disparity in three reports to Congress in 2010,128 2012,129 and 2017.130 In a
2010 report on the demographic differences in federal sentencing practices,
the Commission found that the disparity between white and Black defendants
had actually increased post-Booker.131 The Commission in 2017 reported a
continuation of this trend.132 Judge William Pryor, Jr., the former head of
the Commission,133 has supported reducing judicial discretion in light of this
data.134
121. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233–34 (2005) (noting that the Guidelines
as they were written required a court to sentence within the Guidelines range); Kate Stith, The
Hegemony of the Sentencing Commission, 9 FED. SENT’G REP. 14, 16 (1996) (stating that a
district court’s divergence from the Guidelines would be subject to appeal unless based on an
“atypicality” not already considered by the Guidelines themselves).
122. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 233–36 (finding that the Guidelines, if mandatory, violated
the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial because they required judges to impose sentences
based on facts that were not found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt).
123. See id. at 245; see also Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 101, 104–05 (2007)
(applying the “effectively advisory” language from Booker to crack cocaine sentencing).
124. See Zunkel, supra note 120, at 54.
125. See Chavez-Meza v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1959, 1965 (2018) (explaining that
sentencing judges must at least show that they have “considered the parties’ arguments and
taken account of the § 3553(a) factors, among others”).
126. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 359 (2007) (holding that when a case is
“conceptually simple” and the “context and the record” indicate that the judge has considered
the parties’ arguments and the § 3553(a) factors, the judge need not analyze each factor in
depth).
127. See Chavez-Meza, 138 S. Ct. at 1965–67.
128. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES IN FEDERAL SENTENCING
PRACTICES: AN UPDATE OF THE BOOKER REPORT’S MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSIS 23
(2010) [hereinafter 2010 BOOKER REPORT].
129. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, REPORT ON THE CONTINUING IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V.
BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 4–6 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 BOOKER REPORT].
130. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES IN SENTENCING: AN UPDATE
TO THE 2012 BOOKER REPORT 2, 4 (2017) [hereinafter 2017 BOOKER REPORT].
131. See 2010 BOOKER REPORT, supra note 128, at 23.
132. See 2017 BOOKER REPORT, supra note 130, at 2.
133. See Hon. William H. Pryor, Jr., FEDERALIST SOC’Y, https://fedsoc.org/contributors/
william-pryor [https://perma.cc/M9X9-XTKQ] (last visited Feb. 2, 2022).
134. See William H. Pryor, Jr., Returning to Marvin Frankel’s First Principles in Federal
Sentencing, 29 FED. SENT’G REP. 95, 97–98 (2017) (arguing that the racial disparity in
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These findings, however, have been criticized,135 and there is research
from outside the Commission suggesting that judicial discretion may in fact
decrease racial disparity with respect to sentencing for drug offenses.136
Indeed, the Commission’s own report also noted an increase in the rate of
defendants being sentenced below the Guidelines range since Booker,
including for drug trafficking and firearms offenses, specifically.137
The importance of the § 3553(a) factors post-Booker has clear implications
for defendants like Jose Moyhernandez, whose sentencing is discussed above
and who was essentially denied individualized consideration of his case
under § 3553(a) at his original (pre-Booker) sentencing due to the then
mandatory nature of the Guidelines.138 But mandatory reconsideration of
sentencing found by the 2012 BOOKER REPORT is an “inevitabl[e]” result of judicial discretion
post-Booker to consider defendants’ history and characteristics); see also WILLIAM RHODES
ET AL., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., FEDERAL SENTENCING DISPARITY: 2005–2012, at 40–41
(2015) (attributing the increased sentencing disparity to white defendants receiving more
lenient sentences post-Booker rather than to Black defendants receiving more severe ones).
135. See FED. DEFS. GUIDELINES & LEGIS. COMMS., U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION REPORT
SUGGESTING THAT INCREASED JUDICIAL DISCRETION LEADS TO GREATER RACIAL DISPARITY IS
BASED ON A FLAWED ANALYSIS AND IS BEING MISUSED TO SUPPORT CALLS FOR A MANDATORY
SENTENCING SYSTEM THAT WOULD INCREASE RACIAL INJUSTICE (2018),
https://blog.federaldefendersny.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Fact-Sheet-USSC-Reporton-Racial-Disparity-Is-Flawed-and-Being-Misused-January-2018-final-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KJL4-LZBZ].
136. See, e.g., Rodney Engen, Racial Disparity in the Wake of Booker/Fanfan: Making
Sense of “Messy” Results and Other Challenges for Sentencing Research, 10 CRIMINOLOGY
& PUB. POL’Y 1139, 1141 (2011) (“[T]he findings suggest that disparity overall declined.”);
id. at 1146 (“[S]teps taken in recent years to reduce the ‘crack versus powder cocaine’
differential have probably done more to reduce racial disproportionality in incarceration than
any other policy changes adopted since the guidelines were introduced.”); Joshua B. Fischman
& Max M. Schazenbach, Racial Disparities Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The
Role of Judicial Discretion and Mandatory Minimums, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 729, 757–
761 (2012) (concluding that mandatory minimums substantially increase sentencing disparity
between white and Black defendants and that “judicial discretion does not contribute to, and
may in fact mitigate, racial disparities in Guidelines sentencing”); Paul J. Hofer, Federal
Sentencing After Booker, 48 CRIME & JUST. 137, 161–62 (2019) (“The gap in average
sentences between black and white defendants has shrunk in recent years, from a combination
of commission actions, congressional reform of the crack statutes, and decisions of many
judges to reject guideline recommendations based on unsound and discriminatory policies.”);
Jeffrey T. Ulmer et al., Racial Disparity in the Wake of the Booker/Fanfan Decision, 10
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 1077, 1105–07 (2011) (attributing some of the sentencing
disparity seen post-Booker to, among other things, immigration offenses accounting for a
substantial amount of the disparity post-Booker); see also id. at 1105–06 (noting that the
sentencing disparity seen post-Booker may not have been a result of judicial discretion and
could be explained by (1) Black defendants being more likely than similarly situated white
defendants to be imprisoned once convicted (as opposed to receiving lengthier sentences) and
(2) prosecutors seeking below-Guidelines sentences less frequently for Black defendants).
137. See 2012 BOOKER REPORT, supra note 129, at 6. A pre-Booker report by the
Commission found that the Guidelines and mandatory minimum system in place at the time
“have a greater adverse impact on Black offenders than did the factors taken into account by
judges in the discretionary system in place immediately prior to guidelines implementation.”
See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING: AN ASSESSMENT OF
HOW WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF SENTENCING
REFORM 135 (2004).
138. See United States v. Moyhernandez, 5 F.4th 195, 209 (2d Cir. 2021) (Pooler, J.,
dissenting), petition for cert. filed, No. 21-6009 (U.S. Oct. 15, 2021).
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these factors during section 404 proceedings could also benefit defendants
whose offenses were committed after Booker by requiring judges to assess
the petitioners’ post-sentencing rehabilitation.139 The Supreme Court held in
Pepper v. United States140 that when a defendant’s sentence has been set
aside on appeal, judges are not prohibited from considering post-sentencing
rehabilitation when resentencing the defendant on remand.141 Justice
Sotomayor noted that post-sentencing conduct best illustrates the defendant’s
current “history and characteristics,”142 which sentencing judges must
consider during resentencing.143 Further, post-sentencing conduct also
“sheds light on” the likelihood of recidivism if the defendant is released,
which is relevant to § 3553(a)(2)(B) and § 3553(a)(2)(C), as well as the
defendant’s continuing need for correctional treatment under
§ 3553(a)(2)(D).144 Thus, when a sentence is set aside and remanded, district
courts may assess a defendant’s post-sentencing conduct in order to impose
a sentence that is “‘not greater than necessary,’ to serve the purposes of
sentencing.”145 The rule stated in Pepper applies even if it provides
resentenced defendants with a procedural advantage unavailable to
defendants at initial sentencing.146
Though no longer mandatory after Booker, the Guidelines remain an
important aspect of federal sentencing.147 Indeed, § 3553(a)(4) directs
sentencing judges to refer to the Guidelines when imposing an initial
sentence.148 It is thus important to understand how the Guidelines now
operate in the context of § 3553(a).
C. The U.S. Sentencing Commission and the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines Today
A reconsideration of the § 3553(a) factors would also affect First Step Act
petitioners because initial sentences reflect the sentencing scheme in place at
the time at which they are imposed.149 The time at which these factors are
139. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, DEPARTURE AND VARIANCE PRIMER 15 (2014) (“At
resentencing, a district court may consider evidence of post-sentencing rehabilitation, and such
evidence may, in appropriate cases, support a downward variance from the now-advisory
guideline range.”).
140. 562 U.S. 476 (2011).
141. Id. at 490–91
142. Id. at 492 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)).
143. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).
144. Pepper, 562 U.S. at 493.
145. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)).
146. See id. at 502 (agreeing that consideration of post-sentencing rehabilitation may
benefit defendants whose sentences were set aside on appeal relative to other defendants, but
noting “that disparity arises not because of arbitrary or random sentencing practices, but
because of the ordinary operation of appellate sentencing review.”).
147. See 2012 BOOKER REPORT, supra note 129, at 5 (noting that sentencing courts must
begin the sentencing process by accurately calculating the applicable Guidelines range and
that the average sentence length historically tracks with the minimum Guidelines range).
148. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A)(i).
149. See United States v. Shaw, 957 F.3d 734, 741–42 (7th Cir. 2020) (“Counsel may have
pressed different arguments based on a different statutory framework; a court may have
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considered bears on “the seriousness of the offense,”150 as well as the
applicable Guidelines policies in place.151
The Commission created the Guidelines in 1987.152 Congress established
the Commission as an independent judicial agency in the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984 to, among other things, promote “certainty and fairness” in
sentencing, avoid disparities among similarly situated defendants while
maintaining individualized review, and reflect the “advancement in
knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice process.”153
The Commission operates by (1) promulgating and amending the
Guidelines154 and (2) issuing reports to Congress recommending any
appropriate changes to sentencing legislation.155 A fundamental reason for
the existence of the Guidelines is to avoid sentencing disparity among
defendants guilty of largely similar conduct and with similar criminal
records.156 The Commission also maintains an Office of Research and Data
to conduct research and to collect and publish data on federal sentencing in
practice.157
The Guidelines generate recommended sentences from a table that
accounts for the seriousness of the defendant’s offense and the defendant’s
criminal history.158 There are forty-three offense levels and six criminal
history categories.159 Each crime has a base offense level that may be
aggravated or mitigated by the specific character of the offense.160 For
example, robbery has a base level of twenty, which can be upgraded by five
points if the defendant used a firearm and by two more if the firearm was
discharged.161 The offense level may also be adjusted in either direction
based on factors that apply to any offense, such as a defendant’s minimal

credited those arguments differently, as the statutory minimum and maximum often anchor a
court’s choice of a suitable sentence.”).
150. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A); see also U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS:
COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 100 (2002) (finding that “the offense seriousness
of most crack-cocaine offenders is overstated by the 100-to-1 drug quantity ratio, suggesting
that a differential this extreme is unjust.”).
151. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A)(i).
152. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 14, at 1.
153. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B)–(C).
154. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Commission’s rulemaking
power and its location in the judicial branch in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
The delegation of rulemaking power outlined in 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1) was sufficiently
detailed to constitute a permissible “intelligible principle,” and it was not unconstitutional to
place the agency in the judicial branch because sentencing was one area of law historically
shared between all three branches and Congress maintained a high degree of control over the
Commission. Id. at 374, 379, 390–97.
155. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 14, at 1.
156. Id. at 2.
157. Id. at 27.
158. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2021).
159. Id.
160. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, AN OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 1
(2014),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/about/overview/Overview_Federal_
Sentencing_Guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/VQ9X-KLJT].
161. See id.
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participation in the crime or a defendant’s attempt to cover it up.162 Criminal
history classification is generally based on the amount and length of prior
convictions and whether the current offense was committed while the
defendant was still serving a previous sentence.163
Though not mandatory after Booker,164 the Guidelines still have a
significant impact on sentencing.165 The holding in Booker was not meant
to abolish the Guidelines, and the Guidelines still form “the starting point and
the initial benchmark” at sentencing.166 District courts are instructed to
“remain cognizant of them throughout the sentencing process”167 and will
usually impose a sentence within the applicable range.168 And, in Rita v.
United States,169 the Supreme Court held that on appeal (but only on appeal),
sentences within the applicable Guidelines range are presumptively
reasonable, although a sentence outside the Guidelines is not presumptively
unreasonable.170 In part due to the protection that Rita gives to sentences
within the Guidelines range, the Guidelines have a cognitive “anchoring”
effect on judges.171 This means that judges have a subconscious tendency to
adjust their sentences to conform to the Guidelines range.172 Thus, the
Guidelines, while no longer mandatory, continue to exert a considerable
influence over federal sentencing.173
District courts, however, still often impose sentences outside the
Guidelines range by opting to “depart” or “vary” from the recommended
range.174 After consideration of all of the § 3553(a) factors, the district court
should then decide whether the facts of the case merit a variance outside the
Guidelines range.175 Variances may work in either direction, and courts

162. See id. at 2.
163. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, FEDERAL SENTENCING: THE BASICS 17 (2018). The criminal
history category does not count previous minor offenses such as reckless driving, gambling,
or trespassing. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2(c) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N
2021). Likewise, juvenile offenses committed more than five years prior to the current offense
are not counted. Id. § 4A1.2(d)(2).
164. See supra notes 122–24 and accompanying text.
165. See generally U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 160, at 2.
166. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007).
167. Id. at 50 n.6.
168. See Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 542 (2013).
169. 551 U.S. 338 (2007).
170. See id. at 351–53, 355 (holding that a presumption of reasonableness is permitted at
the appellate level but that there can be no such presumption at trial because litigants there are
entitled to freely argue that the Guidelines should not apply).
171. See Mark W. Bennett, Confronting Cognitive “Anchoring Effect” and “Blind Spot”
Biases in Federal Sentencing: A Modest Solution for Reforming a Fundamental Flaw, 104 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 523–24 (2014).
172. See id. at 495, 498, 529.
173. See generally id. at 523–29.
174. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 14, at 19. Departures are beyond the scope of
this Note, as they are provided for by the Guidelines themselves and do not involve separate
consideration of the § 3553(a) factors. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 139, at 1. For an
in-depth examination of departures, see id. at 4–39.
175. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 139, at 1–2.
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frequently decide that the sentence should be above or below what the
Guidelines suggest after consideration of the § 3553(a) factors.176
In issuing its first set of Guidelines, the Commission generally used an
“empirical approach,” studying (among other sources) 10,000 presentence
investigations, the substantive elements of various criminal statutes, and
guidelines and statistics from the U.S. Parole Commission.177 The
Guidelines are updated based on new empirical findings undertaken by the
Commission’s Office of Research and Data.178 By declining to base the
Guidelines on a recognized philosophical approach to criminal justice (e.g.,
crime control or rehabilitation), the Commission made them subject to
“continuous evolution.”179
One example of this evolution concerns how the Guidelines designate
“career offenders.”180 A defendant is categorized as a career offender if, as
an adult, a defendant is convicted of a “crime of violence” or an offense
involving a controlled substance after having twice been previously
convicted of such an offense.181 A defendant’s status as a career offender
significantly increases the sentencing range recommended by the
Guidelines.182 Recently, however, the Commission amended the Guidelines
to reduce the number of people eligible for career offender status.183 Passed
176. See id. at 40–48 (cataloguing several cases that used the § 3553(a) factors to impose
an above- or below-Guidelines sentence); see, e.g., United States v. Ruvalcava-Perez, 561
F.3d 883, 887 (8th Cir. 2009) (affirming an upward variance due to the defendant’s history of
violence, including against women); United States v. Autery, 555 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir.
2009) (affirming a downward variance granted to a defendant convicted of child pornography
possession where the defendant had no history of substance abuse or sexual abuse and had the
support of his wife and children); United States v. Howe, 543 F.3d 128, 132 (3d Cir. 2008)
(affirming a downward variance based on, among other things, the defendant’s prior military
service, various letters from members of his community attesting to his honorable and lawful
character, and consistent church attendance); United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 195–96
(2d Cir. 2008) (affirming an upward variance that was based on the defendant’s smuggling of
guns into New York City, which is a more serious offense than smuggling guns into less
populated areas, and on a deterrence-based rationale under § 3553(a)(2)).
177. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. (U.S. SENT’G
COMM’N 2021). For crack cocaine sentences, the Commission had earlier based the Guideline
ranges on the Anti-Drug Abuse Act’s weight-based classification rather than its own empirical
research. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 96 (2007). However, after reviewing
the scientific literature and conducting its own research, the Commission amended the
Guidelines in 2007 to reduce the disparity between crack and powder cocaine offenses. See
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, supp., amend. 706 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2011).
This amendment was made retroactive in 2008. See id. amend. 708.
178. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 14, at 27.
179. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 349–50 (2007) (noting that the decision to
use empirical research was a deliberate attempt to avoid choosing between competing
philosophies within the criminal justice community and to ensure that the Commission may
receive input from all sides of the issue when amending the Guidelines).
180. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2021).
181. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: CAREER OFFENDER SENTENCING
ENHANCEMENTS 15 (2016).
182. Id.
183. See Daniel P. Peyton, Comment, Retroactive Justice: Toward Fundamental Fairness
in Resentencing Crack Cocaine Offenders Under Section 404 of the First Step Act, 54 U. RICH.
L. REV. 1165, 1177 (2020).
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in 2016, Guidelines Amendment 798 deleted a provision that defined a crime
of violence as any offense that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a
serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”184 The purpose of this
amendment was to simplify that categorization of crimes of violence and
focus on “the most serious predicate offenses.”185 This new focus aligned
with the Commission’s finding that defendants classified as career offenders
based solely on drug trafficking offenses were less likely to recidivate than
career offenders who had committed a violent offense and would take
relatively longer to recidivate if they ever did.186 Notably, thus far,
approximately 56 percent of defendants granted relief under section 404 of
the First Step Act were originally sentenced as career offenders prior to this
amendment.187
II. IS CONSIDERATION OF § 3553(A) MANDATORY OR DISCRETIONARY
UNDER THE FIRST STEP ACT?
More than three years after the passage of the First Step Act, the circuits
are divided over whether courts must consider the § 3553(a) factors when
deciding section 404 motions. While nearly all permit the lower courts to
consider the § 3553(a) factors anew, whether petitioners are guaranteed
review of these factors depends on where they were initially sentenced. This
part examines each side’s interpretation of section 404 and discusses the split
approaches to the text and legislative intent of the First Step Act, as well as
other practical concerns addressed by certain decisions.
A. The Mandatory Approach: The Third, Fourth, Sixth, and D.C. Circuits
The circuits following the mandatory approach have identified (1) the use
of the word “impose” in the text of section 404, (2) the First Step Act’s
overall intent to remedy past racial discrimination in sentencing, and (3) the
uniformity and clarity of process as reasons to mandate consideration of the
§ 3553(a) factors. This section describes the reasoning of the Third, Fourth,
Sixth, and D.C. Circuits and notes where these circuits may differ.
1. “Impose” Implicates § 3553(a)
The courts following the mandatory approach view the use of the word
“impose” in section 404(b) of the First Step Act as directing district courts to
apply the § 3553(a) factors during proceedings.188 Section 3553(a) by its
184. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, supp., amend. 798 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N
2016). The Commission passed this amendment soon after the Supreme Court’s decision in
Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 602–03 (2015), which abrogated identical language
in a separate sentencing statute for being unconstitutionally vague.
185. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 181, at 52–53.
186. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, REPORT-AT-A-GLANCE: CAREER OFFENDER ENHANCEMENTS
(2016).
187. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 95, tbl.5.
188. See, e.g., United States v. Easter, 975 F.3d 318, 324 (3d Cir. 2020); United States v.
Chambers, 956 F.3d 667, 672–73 (4th Cir. 2020).

2022]

THE FIRST STEP ACT

1685

terms applies any time a court is “imposing” an initial sentence, so these
courts reason that the use of “impose” in section 404(b) is a direction to
follow § 3553(a).189 Further, Congress legislates against a backdrop of prior
sentencing legislation; therefore, when Congress uses the same word in two
related statutes, it may be implied that the word has the same meaning in both
contexts.190 Because Congress could have used the limiting language from
§ 3582(c)(2),191 but did not, these courts have held that the First Step Act
should not be read to restrict the district courts’ ability to resentence
defendants in the same way.192
Under this broad reading, the Third and Sixth Circuits have held that
district courts must consider the § 3553(a) factors, including post-sentencing
conduct, in addition to whether a defendant’s Guidelines range had been
changed by the Fair Sentencing Act.193 The Fourth Circuit, in addition to an
evaluation of petitioners’ post-sentencing conduct,194 has required lower
courts to apply retroactive intervening case law when deciding First Step Act
motions.195 This may entail a recalculation of petitioners’ Guidelines range
based on case law that developed after initial sentencing.196 Each circuit
agrees that once the required analysis is complete, courts then may grant or
deny relief.197
The Sixth Circuit in United States v. Boulding198 additionally held that
“complete review of the motion on the merits,” as provided by section 404(c)
of the First Step Act, calls for consideration of the § 3553(a) factors and an

189. See Easter, 975 F.3d at 324–25; Chambers, 956 F.3d at 674 (citing United States v.
Rose, 379 F. Supp. 3d 223, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 2019), abrogated by United States v.
Moyhernandez, 5 F.4th 195 (2d Cir. 2021), petition for cert. filed, No. 21-6009 (U.S. Oct. 15,
2021)).
190. See Easter, 975 F.3d at 325.
191. See Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 826–27 (2010).
192. See, e.g., Chambers, 956 F.3d at 671–74; United States v. Boulding, 960 F.3d 774,
782–83 (6th Cir. 2020).
193. See Easter, 975 F.3d at 323, 327; United States v. Smith, 959 F.3d 701, 703–04
(6th Cir. 2020).
194. See United States v. McDonald, 986 F.3d 402, 412 (4th Cir. 2021).
195. See Chambers, 956 F.3d at 669–75 (applying Fourth Circuit precedent established
after the defendant’s initial sentence to eliminate the career offender enhancement from the
defendant’s Guidelines calculation); United States v. Lancaster, 997 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir.
2021) (reversing a denial of petitioner’s motion when the lower court did not consider new
case law regarding career offender designation and did not review the § 3553(a) factors in
light of these changes in the law).
196. See Chambers, 956 F.3d at 672 (requiring the district court to update the defendant’s
Guidelines range based on retroactive intervening case law); see also Lancaster, 997 F.3d at
177 (Wilkinson, J., concurring) (noting that the majority’s decision in this case extended the
holding in Chambers to nonretroactive case law).
197. See, e.g., Lancaster, 997 F.3d at 175 (“If, after conducting the analysis, the court
determines that the sentence would not be reduced, then no relief under the First Step Act is
indicated.”); United States v. White, 984 F.3d 76, 85 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (citing United States v.
Jackson, 945 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 2019)) (acknowledging that the First Step Act gives
judges broad discretion to reduce a sentence or not); Easter, 975 F.3d at 327 (noting that
district courts are not required to grant relief).
198. 960 F.3d 774 (6th Cir. 2020).
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updated Guidelines calculation.199 This includes an opportunity for the
petitioner to challenge any sentencing enhancements the district court may
apply in its amended Guidelines calculation or its § 3553(a) analysis.200 The
Sixth Circuit later, however, limited the application of Boulding to instances
where the petitioner’s original Guidelines range was altered by the Fair
Sentencing Act.201
Finally, while these circuits require an updated consideration of the
§ 3553(a) factors, none permit full plenary resentencing during section 404
proceedings.202 This means that defendants are not entitled to a hearing at
which they would be present203 or to completely relitigate the prior
Guidelines determination and initial § 3553(a) analysis.204 Instead, the
district court should fill in the “gaps” remaining from the initial sentencing
in view of “intervening circumstances,”205 which may include health
concerns,206 post-sentencing conduct,207 and new case law that renders a
prior Guidelines range erroneous.208
2. Legislative History Supports a Broader Reading of Section 404
The D.C. Circuit in United States v. White found that the text of section
404 provides no exact limit on a district court’s discretion in deciding First
Step Act motions.209 From this ambiguity, it held that congressional intent
should govern how courts proceed.210 As found in the Congressional
Record, the intent of passing the First Step Act was to correct the
ramifications of a sentencing regime that targeted racial minorities.211 Given
the importance of remedying this unfairness, the court noted that First Step

199. See id. at 784 (“[T]he necessary review—at a minimum—includes an accurate
calculation of the amended guidelines range at the time of resentencing and thorough renewed
consideration of the § 3553(a) factors.”).
200. See id.
201. See United States v. Maxwell, 991 F.3d 685, 690–691 (6th Cir. 2021), petition for
cert. filed, No. 20-1653 (U.S. May 24, 2021). The Sixth Circuit broke with the Fourth
Circuit’s holding in Chambers, holding that no other intervening legal developments besides
the Fair Sentencing Act need be considered during First Step Act proceedings. Id. However,
this decision seemingly did not disturb Boulding’s holding that courts must weigh the
§ 3553(a) factors when ruling on a section 404 motion. See id. at 692–94 (affirming the district
court’s holding where it considered the defendant’s rehabilitation arguments but ultimately
declined to reduce his sentence based on his long history of criminal behavior for most of his
adult life).
202. See, e.g., Lancaster, 997 F.3d at 175; Easter, 975 F.3d at 326; Boulding, 960 F.3d at
782–83.
203. See Easter, 975 F.3d at 326; Boulding, 960 F.3d at 782–83.
204. See Lancaster, 997 F.3d at 175.
205. See id.
206. See Easter, 975 F.3d at 327.
207. See United States v. White, 984 F.3d 76, 93 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
208. See United States v. Chambers, 956 F.3d 667, 674 (4th Cir. 2020).
209. White, 984 F.3d at 88.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 89–90 (citing 164 CONG. REC. S7021, S7764 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 2018)
(statements of Sens. Richard Durbin and Cory Booker)).
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Act petitioners are owed “the most complete relief possible.”212 As such, a
sentencing court must consider the § 3553(a) factors in a way that is
procedurally reasonable.213 Turning to the petitioners before the court, the
D.C. Circuit found that the district court fell below this standard by
neglecting to either mention mitigating § 3553(a) factors in its decision or
hold a hearing on the petitioners’ motions.214 Failing to do either provided
no indication that the district court considered these arguments,215 and such
consideration is required to fulfill Congress’s remedial intent in passing the
First Step Act.216
3. Pragmatic Advantages to Requiring Consideration of the § 3553(a)
Factors
The Third Circuit has also identified “pragmatic advantages” to reading
section 404(b) as mandating consideration of the § 3553(a) factors.217 The
court stated that requiring consideration makes proceedings more
(1) predictable, (2) “straightforward” for lower courts to handle,
(3) consistent for appellate courts on review, and (4) likely to promote
uniform evaluation of motions on the merits.218 Indeed, regarding the
appellate process for section 404 motions, the court questioned whether it
would even be possible to review a district court’s ruling if it did not consider
the § 3553(a) factors.219
Concurring with the Third Circuit’s reasoning in Easter, Judge Rosemary
Pooler’s dissent in United States v. Moyhernandez additionally noted a
logical inconsistency in merely permitting consideration of the § 3553(a)
factors.220 Allowing judges to disregard these factors contravenes Booker
because it gives them discretion to uphold sentences that were based on
mandatory Guidelines ranges that are now advisory, without regard to other
§ 3553(a) factors, which now must be considered.221

212. Id. at 90 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975)).
213. See id. at 90–91.
214. Id. at 92.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 91 (“Nothing less [than consideration of the § 3553(a) factors] is sufficient to
meet the goals of the Fair Sentencing Act and the First Step Act to provide a remedy for
defendants who bore the brunt of a racially disparate sentencing scheme.”).
217. See United States v. Easter, 975 F.3d 318, 325 (3d Cir. 2020).
218. Id.
219. See id. at 324.
220. United States v. Moyhernandez, 5 F.4th 195, 212 (2d Cir. 2021) (Pooler, J.,
dissenting).
221. Id. at 211–12 (noting that Congress was legislating in a post-Booker world); see also
Easter, 975 F.3d at 325 (“Moreover, a permissive regime means that sentencing courts may
ignore the § 3553(a) factors entirely for some defendants and not others, inviting unnecessary
sentencing disparities among similarly situated defendants. Such a regime is antithetical to
Congress’ intent and the Guidelines’ purpose.”).
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B. The Discretionary Approach: The First, Second, Eighth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits
The circuits following the discretionary approach differ from the other
circuits in their interpretation of section 404’s text, the level of discretion the
text affords district judges, and the practical effects of requiring judges to
consider the § 3553(a) factors for every petitioner. This section examines the
arguments favoring this approach.
1. The Inherent Textual Limitations of Section 404
The circuits applying the discretionary approach view the text of section
404 more narrowly than courts that follow the mandatory approach. They
hold that, by its terms, section 404 sends a district court “back in time” to
resentence the defendant “as if” sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act
(and no other since-enacted laws) were in effect when the defendant
committed the covered offense.222 Though “impose” is used both in section
404 and § 3553(a), the discretionary-approach courts have held that the
word’s use in section 404 does not trigger mandatory consideration of the
§ 3553(a) factors because the “as if” clause limits the express reach of section
404 to the Fair Sentencing Act.223 Because § 3553(a) is not mentioned in the
text of either section 404 of the Fair Sentencing Act, there is no requirement
that its provisions inform proceedings.224
Further, and in contrast to the mandatory-approach courts, the
discretionary-approach courts argue that the word “impose” as it appears in
§ 3553(a) does not create the mandatory procedure but rather that the word
“shall” imposes the requirement.225 The exclusion of this mandatory
language from the texts of the Fair Sentencing Act and First Step Act
indicates that Congress did not intend to bind courts to certain procedures
because other statutes use or exclude similar language to expand or limit
judicial discretion.226 For example, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) dictates that
sentencing courts shall consider the § 3553(a) factors, whereas 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(B), which governs motions under the First Step Act in most
circuits,227 merely states that courts may modify a sentence as permitted by
statute.228 Under this reasoning, this discrepancy indicates that courts “must
presume that Congress intentionally chose to omit mandatory consideration”
of the § 3553(a) factors by courts when deciding First Step Act motions.229

222. See United States v. Concepcion, 991 F.3d 279, 286 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 142
S. Ct. 54 (2021) (No. 20-1650) (mem.); Moyhernandez, 5 F.4th at 207.
223. See, e.g., Concepcion, 991 F.3d at 288; Moyhernandez, 5 F.4th at 204; United States v.
Moore, 963 F.3d 725, 727–28 (8th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1118 (2021) (mem.).
224. See, e.g., Concepcion, 991 F.3d at 289–90; Moyhernandez, 5 F.4th at 203; United
States v. Stevens, 997 F.3d 1307, 1315 (11th Cir. 2021); Moore, 963 F.3d at 727.
225. See Moyhernandez, 5 F.4th at 204; Moore, 963 F.3d at 727–28.
226. See Stevens, 997 F.3d at 1315; Moore, 963 F.3d at 727–28.
227. See Ryan, supra note 104, at 94.
228. See Stevens, 997 F.3d at 1315.
229. Id. at 1316.
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Another reason these courts decline to handle section 404 motions like
initial sentencings is that district courts may only reduce a defendant’s
sentence under section 404.230 Under this view, such a restriction further
blunts the effect of the word “impose” because “imposing” a reduced
sentence is essentially the same as simply “reducing” one.231 Section 404
thus implies that resentencing under section 404 constitutes a “step rather
than [the] imposition of a sentence from scratch.”232
Additionally, several circuits view the use of the word “may” in section
404 as granting district courts broad discretion when ruling on section 404
motions.233 To them, requiring courts to follow a specific procedure is at
odds with this inherently permissive language.234 Section 404’s express
statement that it does not require a district court to reduce any sentence
likewise cuts against a reading of the First Step Act that requires
consideration of the § 3553(a) factors.235 That section 404(c) refers to “a
complete review of the motion” does not counteract this argument because
section 404(c) is concerned with limiting repetitive petitions, not defining a
set procedure.236
While courts adopting this reasoning do not require consideration of the
§ 3553(a) factors or intervening legal developments, with the exception of
the Ninth Circuit, none forbid it.237 Following this permissive approach, the
230. See Moyhernandez, 5 F.4th at 204; see also United States v. Kelley, 962 F.3d 470,
477–78 (9th Cir. 2020) (noting that “impose” as it appears in the First Step Act is necessarily
limited because a defendant eligible for a higher sentence on reconsideration could not be duly
sentenced under the Act), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2878 (2021) (mem.).
231. See United States v. Concepcion, 991 F.3d 279, 288 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 142 S.
Ct. 54 (2021) (mem.).
232. See Moyhernandez, 5 F.4th at 204.
233. See, e.g., id. at 205; Stevens, 997 F.3d at 1315; United States v. Mannie, 971 F.3d
1145, 1149 (10th Cir. 2020).
234. See Concepcion, 991 F.3d at 288 (“[A] fresh evaluation of the section 3553(a) factors
would, if honored, impermissibly cabin the discretion that the First Step Act vests in the
district court.”); Stevens, 997 F.3d at 1316 (holding that requiring a § 3553(a) analysis of every
motion “would impermissibly hamper and cabin this wide discretion that Congress expressly
afforded district courts.”).
235. See Stevens, 997 F.3d at 1315.
236. See Moyhernandez, 5 F.4th at 204 (“It is unlikely that Congress ‘obliquely slipped’ a
mandate for additional procedural steps ‘into a provision that bars repetitive litigation.’”
(quoting United States v. Moore, 975 F.3d 84, 91 (2d Cir. 2020))).
237. Compare United States v. Kelley, 962 F.3d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 2020) (finding that a
court may not reduce a sentence beyond what is authorized by the Fair Sentencing Act), with
Concepcion, 991 F.3d at 289 (“[A] district court may, in its discretion, consider other factors
relevant to fashioning a new sentence.”), and Stevens, 997 F.3d at 1314 (“[I]n exercising
[their] discretion, district courts ‘may consider all the relevant factors, including the statutory
sentencing factors’ set forth in § 3553(a)” (quoting United States v. Jones, 962 F.3d 1290,
1304 (11th Cir. 2020))), and Moyhernandez, 5 F.4th at 205 (refusing to prohibit consideration
of the § 3553(a) factors), and United States v. Moore, 963 F.3d 725, 727 (8th Cir. 2020)
(“When reviewing a section 404 petition, a district court may, but need not, consider the
section 3553 factors.”), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1118 (2021) (mem.). Arguing this issue before
the Supreme Court, the U.S. government, while maintaining that the discretionary approach
is optimal, has stated that it would prefer the mandatory approach over a reading of the First
Step Act that would prohibit consideration of post-sentencing behavior. See Transcript of Oral
Argument at 79–80, Concepcion v. United States, No. 20-1650 (U.S. Jan. 19, 2022),
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Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Stevens,238 took the unusual step (among
discretionary-approach courts) of vacating a district court’s denial of relief
to a petitioner.239 There, the court stated that district courts need not apply
§ 3553(a) but reversed because the lower court failed to consider either the
“new history and characteristics arguments raised by Stevens regarding his
post-incarceration rehabilitation” or anything related to his supervised
release term.240 Applying Gall v. United States241 and Rita, it held that
district courts handling section 404 motions must show that they have a
“reasoned basis” for their decisions such that meaningful appellate review is
possible.242 Though reversing in part for failure to adequately address the
defendant’s arguments under § 3553(a) and stating that it may be “best
practice” to do so, the court maintained that it is not required by the First Step
Act.243
2. Pragmatic and Fairness Concerns with Reading Section 404 Too
Broadly
Citing practical arguments not addressed by decisions endorsing the
mandatory approach, other courts have noted that requiring consideration of
anything more than the penalties altered by the Fair Sentencing Act would
complicate section 404 proceedings in practice.244 First, the mandatory
approach could waste judicial resources by forcing courts to conduct a
§ 3553(a) analysis when the motion could otherwise be denied at the
outset.245 This would then have the knock-on effect of drawing attention
away from more “meritorious” motions.246
A separate issue comes from the application of changes in the law that
occurred after petitioners were sentenced.247 Allowing section 404
petitioners to be resentenced pursuant to legal developments unrelated to
crack cocaine would unfairly benefit these offenders relative to other

https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2021/201650_p8k0.pdf [https://perma.cc/V3Q5-2MY5].
238. 997 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2021).
239. Id. at 1317–18.
240. See id. at 1317.
241. 552 U.S. 38 (2007).
242. See Stevens, 997 F.3d at 1317 (first citing Gall, 552 U.S. at 50–51; and then citing
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007)).
243. See id. at 1318.
244. See United States v. Moyhernandez, 5 F.4th 195, 208 (2d Cir. 2021), petition for cert.
filed, No. 21-6009 (U.S. Oct. 15, 2021); United States v. Maxwell, 991 F.3d 685, 692–93
(6th Cir. 2021), petition for cert. filed, No. 20-1653 (U.S. May 24, 2021); United States v.
Concepcion, 991 F.3d 279, 287–88 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 142 S. Ct. 54 (2021) (mem.);
United States v. Kelley, 962 F.3d 470, 478 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2878 (2021)
(mem.).
245. See Moyhernandez, 5 F.4th at 208.
246. See id.
247. See Concepcion, 991 F.3d at 287–88; Maxwell, 991 F.3d at 692–93; Kelley, 962 F.3d
at 478.
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criminal defendants.248 Whereas defendants similarly sentenced for powder
cocaine offenses cannot have their sentences modified based on new law,
crack cocaine offenders would gain such a benefit under a broader reading of
the First Step Act.249 This, the First Circuit reasoned, would lead to the
“replace[ment] [of] one set of sentencing disparities with another.”250
III. THE FIRST STEP ACT SHOULD BE READ TO REQUIRE CONSIDERATION
OF THE § 3553(A) FACTORS
Given these two competing readings of the First Step Act, this part argues
that the mandatory approach reflects a better way of understanding and
applying section 404. Part III.A begins by addressing the central dispute
between the circuits over the word “impose.” It agrees with the
discretionary-approach courts that the word has a different meaning in the
context of section 404 than the meaning it has in § 3553(a) because the First
Step Act inherently permits more limited outcomes than initial sentencing
does. But despite the Act’s limited nature, this part argues that reading the
word “impose” to require consideration of the § 3553(a) factors does not
contravene the Act’s text or intent. Part III.B then argues that, in light of the
broader context in which Congress passed the First Step Act, the Act’s
purpose is actually better served if courts adopt the mandatory approach. Part
III.C then addresses the pragmatic and equitable concerns raised by certain
discretionary-approach courts and concludes that they are not strongly
supported. Finally, Part III.D examines the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in
United States v. Stevens251 to illustrate the confusion that may be caused by
merely permitting consideration of the § 3553(a) factors rather than requiring
it.
A. The Mandatory Approach Aligns with the Text of the First Step Act
The circuits following the discretionary approach correctly note that the
word “impose” does not operate in the First Step Act in the same way it does
in § 3553(a). The § 3553(a) factors in the initial sentencing context can be
used to vary below or above the Guidelines range,252 whereas under the First
Step Act, the factors may only work to reduce or sustain a defendant’s
original sentence.253 This may suggest that Congress did not intend to

248. See Concepcion, 991 F.3d at 287–88; Maxwell, 991 F.3d at 692–93; Kelley, 962 F.3d
at 478.
249. See Maxwell, 991 F.3d at 693; Kelley, 962 F.3d at 478 (describing this advantage as
an impermissible “windfall” for crack cocaine defendants); see also Brief for the United States
at 30, Concepcion v. United States, No. 20-1650 (U.S. Dec. 15, 2021) (noting that this
advantage would also be unavailable to crack cocaine offenders sentenced after the passage
of the Fair Sentencing Act).
250. Concepcion, 991 F.3d at 288.
251. 997 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2021).
252. See supra notes 174–76 and accompanying text.
253. See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5222;
United States v. Moyhernandez, 5 F.4th 195, 204 (2d Cir. 2021), petition for cert. filed, No.
21-6009 (U.S. Oct. 15, 2021); Kelley, 962 F.3d at 478.

1692

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90

require consideration of the § 3553(a) factors because resentencing under the
First Step Act is thus an inherently more limited procedure than initial
sentencing.254 And further, while none of these circuits explicitly cite
legislative history, they do discuss the wide discretion afforded to judges by
the First Step Act,255 which is supported by the Congressional Record.256 It
was important to Congress that the Act not become a vehicle for automatic
sentence reduction,257 and the Act explicitly states that “[n]othing in this
section shall be construed to require a court to reduce any sentence pursuant
to this section.”258 So, requiring courts to implement a procedural step that
often (but not always) operates to reduce a defendant’s sentence259 may not
reflect this grant of discretion.260
The application of the § 3553(a) factors, however, does not inherently
favor section 404 petitioners. Although an analysis of the § 3553(a) factors
can never result in an increased sentence under section 404, it may still
dissuade a court from reducing one.261 The mandatory approach thus does
not necessarily restrict a court’s discretion in deciding whether to grant
relief.262 A court applying a § 3553(a) analysis may still consider a
defendant’s individual circumstances and decide that a sentence reduction is
unwarranted.263 The mandatory approach merely requires the court to
consider all of the relevant § 3553(a) factors, including mitigating evidence
if it exists, before making its decision.264 This balancing process, which can
result in a grant or denial of relief, is consistent with Congress’s express

254. See supra notes 175–76 and accompanying text.
255. See, e.g., Moyhernandez, 5 F.4th at 205; Stevens, 997 F.3d at 1316; Concepcion, 991
F.3d at 289–90.
256. See 164 CONG. REC. S7739 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2018) (statement of Sen. Charles
Schumer); id. at S7748 (statement of Sen. Amy Klobuchar).
257. See id. at S7748 (statement of Sen. Amy Klobuchar).
258. First Step Act § 404(c).
259. See supra note 176.
260. This broad discretion may, however, contravene the Ninth Circuit’s unique position
that the analysis is limited to whether a defendant’s sentence would have been altered by the
Fair Sentencing Act, United States v. Kelley, 962 F.3d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 2020), as this would
seem to make evaluation of section 404 motions “automatic,” which is something Congress
sought to avoid, see 164 CONG. REC. S7748 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2018) (statement of Sen. Amy
Klobuchar).
261. See, e.g., United States v. Maxwell, 991 F.3d 685, 694 (6th Cir. 2021), petition for
cert. filed, No. 20-1653 (U.S. May 24, 2021).
262. See United States v. Boulding, 960 F.3d 774, 782 (6th Cir. 2020) (“[A] defendant’s
sentence will not be altered absent the court’s reasoned determination to do so.”).
263. See Jonathan D. Colan, A Brief History of Section 404’s Crack Sentencing Reform, 69
DOJ J. FED. L. & PRAC. Sept. 2021, at 57, 89 (noting instances where the § 3553(a) factors
favored a denial of relief). Such consideration may include post-sentencing behavior, as well
as facts presented during the defendant’s initial sentencing. See, e.g., United States v. Black,
992 F.3d 703, 705 (8th Cir. 2021) (noting the defendant’s history of domestic violence, prior
convictions for crack cocaine possession, and violent infractions while in prison); Maxwell,
991 F.3d at 693 (affirming denial of relief where the district court weighed the defendant’s
leadership role in a drug trafficking organization, his criminal history, and his likelihood of
recidivating against his positive behavior while in prison).
264. See United States v. White, 984 F.3d 76, 91–93 (D.C. Cir. 2020); see also supra notes
36–43 and accompanying text.
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opposition to authorizing automatic sentence reductions under the First Step
Act.265
B. The Mandatory Approach Promotes Congress’s Intent in Passing the
First Step Act
The mandatory approach also adheres more closely to the broader intent
behind the First Step Act. Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act and First
Step Act in acknowledgement of the injustice meted out by the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act’s harsh sentencing regime.266 The sentences designed by the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act were scientifically baseless,267 ineffective at
incarcerating the upper-level drug dealers it intended to target,268 and racially
discriminatory.269 And for decades, crack cocaine offenders were sentenced
under mandatory Guidelines ranges that were later deemed
unconstitutional.270 If a court may choose to ignore the § 3553(a) factors
when evaluating motions under section 404, it has the power to confine these
offenders to sentences that the law now views as impermissibly restrictive.271
This especially deprives a defendant like Jose Moyhernandez,272 who was
initially sentenced under such a system,273 of a fair process.
Importantly, this question also affects defendants sentenced after Booker.
Mandatory consideration of the § 3553(a) factors will mean that courts
moving forward will be required to consider post-sentencing behavior.274
This will reward those who have truly rehabilitated themselves, which was
one of the purposes of the First Step Act.275
It will also determine whether these defendants will be subjected to
intervening case law and Guidelines amendments issued during their
imprisonment, including changes made to the determination of “career
265. See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404(c), 132 Stat. 5194, 5222; see
also 164 CONG. REC. S7739 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2018) (statement of Sen. Charles Schumer);
id. at S7748 (statement of Sen. Amy Klobuchar).
266. See 156 CONG. REC. 3658 (2010) (statement of Sen. Richard Durbin); 164 CONG. REC.
S7764 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2018) (statement of Sen. Cory Booker); id. at S7644 (statement of
Sen. Richard Durbin).
267. See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text.
268. See 132 CONG. REC. 27193 (1986) (statement of Sen. Robert Byrd); supra note 61 and
accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 64–70 and accompanying text.
270. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233–35 (2005).
271. See United States v. Moyhernandez, 5 F.4th 195, 209 (2d Cir. 2021) (Pooler, J.,
dissenting) (noting that Judge Mukasey at initial sentencing would have imposed a
below-Guidelines range had it been possible), petition for cert. filed, No. 21-6009 (U.S. Oct.
15, 2021).
272. Defendants originally sentenced prior to 2005 make up approximately 27 percent of
successful section 404 petitioners so far. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 97, tbl. 2.
273. See Moyhernandez, 5 F.4th at 209 (Pooler, J., dissenting).
274. See United States v. White, 984 F.3d 76, 92–93 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (finding defendants’
model conduct while incarcerated as strongly favoring sentence reduction); United States v.
Chambers, 956 F.3d 667, 674–75 (4th Cir. 2020) (finding post-sentencing behavior may be
highly relevant to sentencing under § 3553(a)).
275. See 164 CONG. REC. S7745 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2018) (statement of Sen. Richard
Blumenthal).
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offender” status.276 Despite losing their binding authority after Booker,277
the Guidelines still act as an “anchor” that heavily impacts judicial discretion
at sentencing.278 They also remain a factor to be considered under
§ 3553(a)(4),279 and it is noteworthy under § 3553(a)(2)(C)280 that
nonviolent career offenders have a lower rate of recidivism relative to other
career offenders.281 Thus, a guaranteed recalculation of the Guidelines range
would provide a defendant with the opportunity to have his case reassessed
both free from highly influential recommendations that the Commission later
deemed erroneous and in light of Guidelines reflecting up-to-date data,
especially regarding the likelihood of recidivism.282
Contrary to the reasoning of courts following the discretionary approach,
this procedural step would not rob the district court of its discretion because
the Guidelines are, after all, advisory.283 As discussed in Part I.C, when
imposing an initial sentence, judges may still vary from the Guidelines if they
believe that a defendant’s individual circumstances merit doing so.284 If the
same standard applies to motions under section 404, a district judge could
yet decide that, despite a new Guidelines range, the nature of a defendant’s
specific case means sentence reduction is unwarranted. Thus, an updated
Guidelines calculation would not require strict adherence; it would just
ensure that judges provide a reason for declining to use it.285
Requiring renewed consideration of the § 3553(a) factors would also
create uniformity in First Step Act proceedings. As it stands, whether
defendants must receive such consideration is arbitrarily determined by the
location of their original sentencing.286 This is at odds with Congress’s
overall desire in passing the Sentencing Reform Act to minimize sentencing
disparity among similarly situated defendants while ensuring that they
receive individually tailored sentences.287 It would thus fit with two
important objectives of sentencing to implement a single procedure that
provides individualized evaluation to all defendants—and crucially, one that

276. Compare United States v. Lancaster, 997 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2021) (requiring the
application of intervening, nonretroactive case law to the defendant’s case), with United States
v. Concepcion, 991 F.3d 279, 289–90 (1st Cir.) (declining to require that courts consider any
changes in the law beyond those set forth in the Fair Sentencing Act), cert. granted, 142 S. Ct.
54 (2021) (mem.).
277. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259–64 (2005).
278. See Bennett, supra note 171, at 523–29.
279. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4).
280. See id. § 3553(a)(2)(C) (describing the need for the sentence to reflect the likelihood
of the defendant committing future crimes).
281. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 186.
282. See supra notes 177–87.
283. See supra notes 123–26.
284. See supra notes 175–76.
285. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007) (holding that when imposing a
sentence outside the Guidelines range, a judge must have “sufficiently compelling” reasons
that justify the extent of the divergence from the Guidelines).
286. See supra Part II.
287. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
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does not mandate a single outcome.288 Further, such a procedure would not
produce significant practical hurdles or unfair sentencing practices.
C. The Mandatory Approach Does Not Undermine Practicality or Fairness
in Section 404 Proceedings
Certain courts have noted that the mandatory consideration of intervening
legal and factual developments would advantage crack cocaine offenders
sentenced prior to 2010 relative to other similarly situated criminal
defendants,289 which would contravene § 3553(a) by promoting
inter-defendant disparity.290 However, this places too little weight on the
fundamental fact that the First Step Act was narrowly focused on this specific
class of defendant.291 The act recognized that inmates still serving sentences
based on the Anti-Drug Abuse Act’s penalty structure were uniquely
disadvantaged relative to other defendants.292 Further, the First Step Act as
conceived originally contemplated only an estimated 2600 prisoners’
sentences.293 As there were approximately 2,100,000 people incarcerated
when this legislation was passed,294 the focus on such a small group of
inmates indicates a magnified attentiveness to the sentences of these
particular persons. And under Pepper, a court at resentencing may consider
evidence of a defendant’s post-sentencing rehabilitation even if it may confer
to the defendant a benefit unavailable to other defendants sentenced for
similar conduct.295
Further, the Second Circuit’s pragmatic concerns296 are not strong. The
Supreme Court has held that consideration of the § 3553(a) factors at initial
sentencing need not be extensively detailed when the case is “conceptually
simple.”297 So long as the record indicates that the court heard a defendant’s
mitigating evidence under § 3553(a), judges are allowed to sign a form which
states that they carefully considered all of the § 3553(a) factors.298 Thus, if
288. See 164 CONG. REC. S7739 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2018) (statement of Sen. Charles
Schumer); id. at S7748 (statement of Sen. Amy Klobuchar).
289. See United States v. Maxwell, 991 F.3d 685, 692–93 (6th Cir. 2021), petition for cert.
filed, No. 20-1653 (U.S. May 24, 2021); United States v. Concepcion, 991 F.3d 279, 288 (1st
Cir.), cert. granted, 142 S. Ct. 54 (2021) (mem.); United States v. Kelley, 962 F.3d 470, 478
(9th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2878 (2021) (mem.).
290. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).
291. See supra Part I.A.3.
292. See 164 CONG. REC. S7764 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2018) (statement of Sen. Cory Booker);
id. at S7745 (statement of Sen. Richard Blumenthal).
293. See id. at S7745 (statement of Sen. Richard Blumenthal). This would later prove to
be an underestimate. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 97, tbl.1.
294. See 164 CONG. REC. S7745 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2018) (statement of Sen. Richard
Blumenthal).
295. See Ryan, supra note 104, at 102 (noting, however, that applying Pepper’s reasoning
to section 404 proceedings requires a “logical leap”).
296. See United States v. Moyhernandez, 5 F.4th 195, 208 (2d Cir. 2021) (“Formal
consideration of the § 3553(a) factors in every case would put sand in the gears, and delay
consideration of the many meritorious motions.”), petition for cert. filed, No. 21-6009 (U.S.
Oct. 15, 2021).
297. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 359 (2007).
298. See Chavez-Meza v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1959, 1965 (2018).
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courts deciding section 404 petitions must only consider the § 3553(a) factors
to the extent they already do at initial sentencing, straightforward cases will
require that judges only take the short step of signing a form without
describing their reasoning in depth.299 For potentially “meritorious”300
claims, however, district courts must accordingly do more.301
While the procedure necessary to adhere to § 3553(a) at initial sentencing
does not always require judges to provide deep analysis,302 it guarantees at
least some record on which the defendant can appeal and ensures that the
district court does not improperly ignore the defendant’s arguments.303
While it is apparent from the cases discussed above that district courts may
misapply the § 3553(a) factors or selectively apply them,304 a procedural
guarantee makes these errors discoverable and more easily rectifiable on
appeal.305
The mandatory approach also has the pragmatic advantage of providing
clear instructions to district courts, a point highlighted by the Eleventh
Circuit’s decision in United States v. Stevens.306
D. The Mandatory Approach Provides Greater Clarity
Finally, the mandatory approach provides more clarity to district courts.
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Stevens illustrates the confusion created
by granting district judges discretion to ignore § 3553(a). In simply reverting
to the sentencing standards set out in Gall307 and Rita,308 the Eleventh Circuit
failed to explain how a district court can provide adequate grounds for its
decision without considering the § 3553(a) factors.309 Both Gall and Rita
299. See Rita, 551 U.S. at 359; Chavez-Meza, 138 S. Ct. at 1965.
300. See Moyhernandez, 5 F.4th at 208.
301. See Rita, 551 U.S. at 357 (“Where the defendant or prosecutor presents nonfrivolous
reasons for imposing a different sentence, however, the judge will normally go further and
explain why he has rejected those arguments.”).
302. See Chavez-Meza, 138 S. Ct. at 1965.
303. See United States v. Easter, 975 F.3d 318, 324 (3d Cir. 2020).
304. See, e.g., United States v. White, 413 F. Supp. 3d 15, 51–52 (D.D.C. 2019), rev’d and
remanded, 984 F.3d 76 (D.C. Cir. 2020); United States v. Chambers, No. 03-cr-1131, 2019
WL 3072641, at *3 (W.D.N.C. July 12, 2019), vacated and remanded, 956 F.3d 667 (4th Cir.
2020).
305. See United States v. White, 984 F.3d 76, 91–93 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (highlighting the
§ 3553(a) factors missed by the district court and instructing the district court to consider the
facts on remand); United States v. Chambers, 956 F.3d 667, 675 (4th Cir. 2020) (vacating the
district court’s denial of relief in part because the district court did not consider the defendant’s
post-sentencing conduct); see also Easter, 975 F.3d at 324 (questioning whether appellate
review of section 404 decisions is possible if the lower court neglects to consider § 3553(a)).
306. 997 F.3d 1307, 1317 (11th Cir. 2021).
307. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007) (holding that on initial sentencing,
a district court “must adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate
review and to promote the perception of fair sentencing”).
308. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007) (“The sentencing judge should set
forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and
has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.”).
309. See Stevens, 997 F.3d at 1317 (holding that the degree of explanation required for
denying a section 404 motion is the same as in the initial sentencing context).
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refer to what a judge must do when imposing an initial sentence, as the court
in Stevens itself noted.310 Further, Gall specifically reaffirms that district
court judges must evaluate the § 3553(a) factors before determining a
sentence.311 Indeed, the district court at this stage may not even presume that
the Guidelines range is appropriate because defendants are entitled to
individualized review of their cases based on § 3553(a).312 Moreover, the
Stevens court vacated the district court’s decision in part specifically because
the district court did not demonstrate that it had considered the defendant’s
arguments under § 3553(a).313 It is therefore unclear how district courts
following the discretionary approach, at least in the Eleventh Circuit, may
avoid consideration of the § 3553(a) factors. By explicitly requiring such
consideration, the mandatory approach thus provides district courts with
comparatively simpler instruction.
CONCLUSION
While a plain reading of section 404’s text may not demand it, requiring
consideration of the § 3553(a) factors does not contravene the text.
Moreover, this approach is preferable in light of both Congress’s intent in
passing the First Step Act and the practical advantages provided by a
mandatory procedure. The First Step Act was intended to provide a remedy
for people sentenced to decades in prison based on laws that Congress and
society now acknowledge were unfair. It focused on a narrow class of
offenders whose situations were particularly egregious. It would thus
contravene this legislation to deny these people guaranteed individualized
review of their cases.
Further, such an approach would promote procedural uniformity and
clarity without causing unnecessary delays. Courts may already use
streamlined processes for handling straightforward § 3553(a) arguments at
initial sentencing. Requiring all courts to consider the § 3553(a) factors in
the context of section 404 motions would not impair these streamlined
processes. In fact, as exemplified by the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in
Stevens, district courts would have clear and uniform instructions for what
they must do to satisfy section 404. This Note therefore concludes that
district courts should be required to conduct a complete § 3553(a) analysis
before deciding whether to reduce a section 404 petitioner’s sentence.

310. See id.
311. See Gall, 552 U.S. 38, 49–50 (2007) (“Accordingly, after giving both parties an
opportunity to argue for whatever sentence they deem appropriate, the district judge should
then consider all of the § 3553(a) factors to determine whether they support the sentence
requested by a party.”).
312. See id.
313. See Stevens, 997 F.3d at 1317.

